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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION; D. H. WHIT-
TENBURG, Chairman, and LAY-
TON MAXFIELD and LORENZO 
J. BOTT, members of the State Road 
Commission, 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOLEY, INCORPORATED, a corpora-
tion, et al., Defendants, 
and 
BOYD W. CALTON and MARY CAL-
TON, 
Intervenors. 
Case No. 
8274 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND PETITIONER 
ON INTERMEDIATE APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order per-
mitting intervention by respondents in a condemnation pro-
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ceedings. The State of Utah by and through its Road Com-
mission commenced condemnation proceedings in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court and sought to condemn 
certain property of the defendants, Boley, Incorporated, 
a corporation; Phillip Green and Leah Green; Julia Fox 
Hunter; Orville Vibbert and Rowene Russon; Mark Vib-
bert, for highway construction purposes. The intervenors 
were the lessees of one C. G. Wilson Helm, the record owner 
of a parcel of land adjacent to the highway but not a part 
of any of the lands, owned by the above named defendants, 
which the State sought to condemn in this proceeding. By 
amicable settlement and through warranty deed, the State 
had secured from the said C. G. Wilson Helm a strip of 
land for right-of-way purposes which was a portion of the 
premises that C. G. Wilson Helm had leased to the inter-
venors and of which the intervenors were in possession. 
We are not here in any way concerned with the rights of 
the intervenors under their lease agreement. The specific 
question here is : 
"Can a landowner [lessee] claiming a trespass 
by the State maintain an action on such a claim 
by intervening in a condemnation proceeding not 
involving the claimant's [lessee's] lands allegedly 
trespassed upon?" 
The following map shows the proximity of the lands 
of the defendants to the condemnation proceedings with 
relation to the location of the leasehold of the intervenors. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE CLAIM IS NOT PROPERLY AN INTER-
VENTION. 
POINT II. 
INTERVENORS HAD NO INTERVENTION OF 
RIGHT. 
POINT III. 
INTERVENORS' CLAIM SHOULD PROPER-
LY BE PRESENTED TO THE BOARD OF 
EXAMINERS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE CLAIM IS NOT PROPERLY AN INTER-
VENTION. 
Intervenors' motion suggests as its basis "* * * 
that the intervenors' defense and the main action herein 
have questions of law and fact in common and that the 
representation of the intervenors' interest by existing 
parties may be inadequate." 
An analysis of the main action, and of intervenors' 
claim, shows that there is no common question of law or 
fact. The issues of the main case are the invariable issues 
of condemnation: (1) the public necessity of the taking; 
(2) value of property taken; and (3) severance damage. 
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Issues presented by intervenors' claim are: (1) whether 
the Road Commission's entry was privileged and if not 
(2) what damage was done the leasehold interest. It must 
be remembered that intervenors' leased land is in no way 
the subject of the main condemnation action; it is a dif-
ferent, unrelated tract. The issues of the two cases are 
most dissimilar. It is plain that the trial of intervenors' 
claim will have to be severed from the trial (or separate 
trials) of the main case. A jury could not conceivably 
handle both cases at once. Thus, the intervention is noth-
ing but a new, unrelated claim sought to be thrust into a 
pending action with which it has nothing in common. There 
is as much reason for an intervention into a pending crim-
inal case, or water case, to which the State is a party. 
Intervenors also assert that the representation of their 
interest in the main case by the named parties may be in-
adequate. The plain answer is that intervenors have no 
interest in the main case. The leased premises are not 
sought to be taken ; the landlord is not named a party; 
the intervenors do not allege an interest in any land be-
longing to any named party. 
POINT II. 
INTERVENORS HAD NO INTERVENTION OF 
RIGHT. 
Rule 24 (a), Rules of Civil Procedure, U. C. A. 1953, 
provides: 
"(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely ap-
. plication anyone shall be permitted to intervene in 
an action: (1) when a statute confers an uncondi-
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tional right to intervene; or (2) when the represen-
tation of. the applicant's interest by existing parties 
is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may 
be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3) when 
the applicant is so situated as to be adversely af-
fected by a distribution or other disposition of prop-
erty which is in the custody or subject to the control 
or disposition of the court or an officer thereof." 
In resisting the State's "Petition for Intermediate 
Appeal," heretofore granted, the intervenors say only that 
their motion to intervene was allowed by the trial court 
under Rule 24. They do not allege, nor can they, that they 
meet any of the requirements of said rule. (1) What stat-
ute affords intervenors an unconditional right to inter-
vene? ( 2) Wherein do the existing parties even remotely, 
or at all, propose to represent the applicant's interest; 
how can the applicant be bound by a judgment in this 
cause? (3) What property is in the custody or subject to 
the control or disposition of the court below that could 
adversely affect any interest of the applicant in his lease-
hold interest? 
Under this rule this Court has said: 
"The question to be answered, * * * is * * * 
has B [the intervenors] such an interest in the sub-
ject-matter in dispute between A [the State] and C 
[the defendants] that entitled him to intervene." 
Dayton v. Free, et al., 49 Utah 221, 224, 162 P. 614. 
We here respectfully contend that intervenors are clearly 
without interest in the subject-matter of this cause. 
Nor is there a right of "Permissive Intervention" un-
der Rule 24 (b) for: ( 1) There is no statute conferring a 
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conditional right; (2) we contend that the applicants' 
claim has no question of law or fact in common with that 
of the defendants to the State's cause; ( 3) it is clear that 
applicants cannot intervene as governmental officers or 
agents. 
The majority rule is, we think, that: The interest 
which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other 
parties must be direct and immediate in character, and not 
consequential; and the intervenor must stand to either gain 
or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the iudgment. 
Utah Power and Light Co. v. Ogden, 95 Utah 161, 79 P. 2d 
61; City of Alhambra v. Jacob Bean Realty Co., (Graves, 
Intervenor) (Cal.) 31 P. 2d 1052; City of Burlingame v. 
County of San Mateo, (Cal.) 230 P. 2d 375, and cases there 
cited. See generally "Parties" Key No. 40 (2), American 
Digest System. 
POINT III. 
INTERVENORS' CLAIM SHOULD PROPER-
LY BE PRESENTED TO THE BOARD OF 
EXAMINERS. 
Intervenors seek to employ the intervention process 
of Rule 24, U. R. C. P., to bring a civil suit against the 
State of Utah. The law is clear that this cannot be done. 
The question is settled by Hjorth v. Whittenburg, ... Utah 
... , 241 P. 2d 907, a factually similar case. See also Camp-
bell Bldg. Co. v. State Road Commission, 95 Utah 242, 70 
P. 2d 857. 
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The correct forum to determine this claim is the Board 
of Examiners, and not the courts. Intervenors apparently 
fear that this remedy is not an adequate remedy. The 
theoretical answer is that the courts cannot presume that 
the executive and legislative departments will fail in their 
duty. The practical answer is that the plaintiffs in the 
Hjorth case apparently had similar fears. They were ade-
quately compensated. See Item 1, Sec. 18, Ch. 134, Laws 
of Utah 1953. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of the court below permitting intervention 
should be set aside. 
Respectfully submi~ed, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
JOHN W. HORSLEY, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Counsel for Plaintiff and Petitioner. 
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